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CLIMATE-ENERGY SINKS AND SOURCES: 
PARIS AGREEMENT & DYNAMIC FEDERALISM 
Elizabeth Burleson* 
INTRODUCTION 
Broad and rapid ratification of the Paris Agreement under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change provides a path 
by which regions within nations can advance energy innovation and 
climate resilience. Federalism is underway in the form of dynamic 
governance within and among states.1 This Article analyzes the multi-
dimensional energy-climate governance approach that the global 
community seeks to carry out. 
It is no small task to balance greenhouse gas sinks and sources by 
the middle of the century. Cities account for 70 percent of global 
greenhouse gas emissions.2 The Compact of Mayors has inspired over 
360 cities to commit to cutting their emissions 17 percent by 2030.3 In 
addition to ramping up the capacity of communities large and small to 
                                                                 
* Elizabeth Burleson writes reports for the UN and presents on treaty making for the 
UN Office of Legal Affairs /UNITAR, having participated in the drafting process for 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Agenda 
21, and the Rio Declaration. She is an expert contributor to the International Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC). Her NGO BurlesonInstitute.org is part of the UNFCCC 
Climate Technology Center and Network. She holds an LL.M. from the London 
School of Economics in International Law and has taught energy law, water law, 
environmental law, international environmental law, International human rights law, 
and public international law. 
 1. See, e.g., John H. Knox, The United States, Environmental Agreements, And 
The Political Question Doctrine, 40 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 933 (2015). 
 2. Gayathri Vaidyanathan, How to Measure the Results of Paris Talks? It’s a 
Work in Progress, CLIMATEWIRE (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/
climatewire/2015/12/14/stories/1060029449 [http://perma.cc. 86MX-GYVR]. 
 3. Laura Lee Dooley, 400 Cities Join Compact of Mayors Pledge to Cut 
Emissions, WORLD RESOURCES INST. (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.wri.org/content/
400-cities-join-compact-mayors-pledge-cut-emissions [http://perma.cc/Y8QC-
Z5V3]. 
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reduce the sources of greenhouse gases, indigenous communities are 
core to initiatives that can sustain forests as sinks. This Article 
analyzes the Paris Agreement. It will consider the role that regions 
within nation state boundaries have played in launching climate 
leadership in the face of a substantial collective action challenge. Low 
lying cities and front line indigenous communities have begun rallying 
available resources towards energy innovation and climate adaptation. 
This Article concludes that cooperative federalism has expanded in the 
climate context, providing transboundary climate leadership and 
ongoing means of energy innovation and climate resilience 
engagement. 
PARIS AGREEMENT: SUSTAINED ENGAGEMENT AND CLIMATE 
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
The 2015 Paris Agreement provides tools to collectively ratchet up 
climate ambition and implementation. The Paris Agreement4 and 
accompanying COP 21 Decision5 together map collective climate 
engagement on such thorny elements as: 
Mitigation - reducing emissions fast enough to achieve the 
temperature goal 
A transparency system and global stock-take - accounting 
for climate action 
Adaptation - strengthening ability of countries to deal with 
climate impacts 
Loss and damage - strengthening ability to recover from 
climate impacts 
                                                                 
 4. Conference of the Parties’ Twenty-first Session, U.N. Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Paris Agreement]. The Paris 
Agreement went into effect on Nov. 4, 2016. Id. 
 5. Conference of the Parties’ Twenty-first Session, U.N. Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement in Decision 1 of 
the COP 21 Decisions, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Dec. 12, 2015) 
[hereinafter COP 21 Decision]. 
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Support - including finance, for nations to build clean, 
resilient futures.6 
Key elements of the Paris Agreement include: submitting and 
implementing increasingly ambitious nationally determined 
contributions in five-year cycles.7 The requisite funding and the 
facilitative nature of five-year review/stock taking cycles remain broad 
brush rather than clearly defined, yet a transparency framework is 
expected to help ratchet up implementation.8 Parties have set a long-
term trajectory through national climate action plans and are 
coordinating peaking emissions as soon as possible.9 The Paris 
Agreement sets forth the principle that future national plans will be no 
less ambitious than existing ones. The 188 climate action plans 
submitted to date serve as a foundation for higher ambition.10 At the 
core of the Agreement, parties will submit their updated plans, called 
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), every five years in a 
process that seeks to ratchet up climate ambition.11 
Increasing ambition is to occur through a two-stage process, 
recognizing that the current provisions do not add up to the agreed 
upon 2°C temperature goal let alone 1.5°C.12 The global average 
temperature has already risen roughly 1°C (1.75°F) from pre-industrial 
levels. Vulnerable nations seeking to set 1.5°C (2.7°F) as a legally 
binding long term mitigation target did not succeed in requiring the 
global community to meet this scientific threshold but did manage to 
                                                                 
 6. Id.; Press Release, UNFCCC, Historic Paris Agreement on Climate Change: 
195 Nations Set Path to Keep Temperature Rise Well Below 2 Degrees Celsius (Dec. 
12, 2015) (on file with author). 
 7. See Paris Agreement, Art. 14, supra note 4. 
 8. Meinhard Doelle, The Paris Climate Agreement: Historic Breakthrough in 
Spite of Shortcomings, DALEHOUSIE U. (Dec. 13, 2015), https://blogs.dal.ca/
melaw/2015/12/13/the-paris-climate-agreement-historic-breakthrough-in-spite-of-
shortcomings/. 
 9. See CAIT CLIMATE DATA EXPLORER, http://cait.wri.org/indc/ (last visited 
2016).  The World Resources Institute tracks Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDCs) of countries to better determine whether the world will 
achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. 
 10. See Press Release, UNFCCC, supra note 6. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See id. 
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gain broad consensus for its inclusion as a strongly stated aspirational 
goal.13 
Until the Paris Agreement enters into force, an interim 2018 
facilitative dialogue will take stock of collective country action.14 This 
will occur under the accompanying COP 21 Decision to the Paris 
Agreement and should inform the nature and caliber of future 
commitments.15 The global community must now set to work 
iteratively implementing and strengthening climate action. 
SUSTAINABILITY PREAMBLE 
The Paris Agreement Preamble embraces climate coordination in 
the broader global sustainability endeavor.16 It does so by referencing 
the sustainable development goals and by specifically 
Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of 
humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address 
climate change, respect, promote and consider their 
respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, 
the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, 
migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in 
vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well 
                                                                 
 13. See Camila Domonoske, 2 Degrees, $100 Billion: The World Climate 
Agreement, By the Numbers, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 12, 2015, 5:33 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/12/12/459502597/2-degrees-100-
billion-the-world-climate-agreement-by-the-numbers?utm_medium=
RSS&utm_campaign=environment [http://perma.cc/HDN8-TTQE]. 
 14. See, e.g., GNelson, CAN Position on the Facilitative Dialogue 2018, 
CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK INT’L (Apr. 19, 2017, 7:27 AM), 
http://www.climatenetwork.org/publication/can-position-facilitative-dialogue-
2018-april-2017 [http://perma.cc./VM7G-ECGN]. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See Paris Agreement, supra note 4, at 1. The text of the Paris Agreement 
Preamble reads as follows:  
Welcoming the adoption of United Nations General Assembly resolution 
A/RES/70/1, ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development,’ in particular its goal 13, and the adoption of the Addis 
Ababa Action Agenda of the third International Conference on Financing 
for Development and the adoption of the Sendai Framework for Disaster 
Risk Reduction. 
Id. 
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as gender equality, empowerment of women and 
intergenerational equity.17  
The preamble emphasizes the significant gap between the aggregate 
effect of parties’ mitigation pledges and actually holding the increase 
in the global average temperature to well below 2°C let alone 1.5°C. 
TAKING STOCK OF PARIS DIPLOMACY AND SUSTAINABILITY 
ENGAGEMENT 
Significant elements that did not find landing zones in Paris include: 
compensation for loss and damages, reference to indigenous rights in 
operative areas of the agreement, and a call for curbing fossil-fuel 
extraction.18 Finance and technology commitments may be more 
diffuse than those set forth in the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC).19 Strict prohibitions and substantive 
affirmative duties have been put aside in favor of engaging the global 
community in iterative reviews that can collectively meet long term 
reductions in global temperatures and facilitate climate 
adaptation/resilience. 
Parties are legally bound to a transparency framework to track 
progress. They must communicate their increasingly ambitious 
nationally determined contributions. At the core of the Paris 
Agreement are five-year cycle reviews of each nationally determined 
contribution. While legally bound to communicate nationally 
determined contributions, parties are not legally bound to exact 
nationally determined contribution targets. Global stocktaking offers 
steppingstones for coordinated mitigation, adaptation, technology 
                                                                 
 17. Id. 
 18. Personal observation of author who has been an IUCN Delegate to the climate 
talks and who can highlight the debates that do not garner sufficient consensus to be 
included in COP outcome documents. 
 19. See Paris Agreement - Status of Ratification, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/
items/9485.php [hereinafter UNFCCC, Status Agreement Tracker]; see also United 
Nations General Assembly, Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee 
for a Framework Convention on Climate Change on the Work of the Second Part of 
its Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1 (May 15, 1992). One 
hundred sixty-five countries ratified the UNFCCC. The convention entered into 
force March 21, 1994. See id. 
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sharing and support. By holding ongoing, five-year stocktakes20 
midway through the nationally determined contribution cycle, an 
upwardly ratcheting climate response must do the heavy lifting of 
keeping global warming well below 2°C let alone 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels.21 
Atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations may react more 
unpredictably to global temperature increases than negotiators 
anticipate. How climate feedbacks drive future climate change is not a 
highly granular mapping exercise yet. Generally speaking, in addition 
to small island nations, low lying main lands are increasingly front 
line, vulnerable communities – “Manhattan needs 1.5°C. So does 
Miami and so does Shanghai.”22 While broadening understanding of 
the gap between political will and requisite curbing of greenhouse 
gasses is translating into greater coordination. The gap remains vast. 
Parties have agreed to keep meeting to try to agree on how to mitigate, 
adapt, share environmentally and socially sound tech, integrate 
sustained support, etc. . . . Every five years, global stocktakes will 
review progress towards the long-term goal of keeping global 
temperature rise well below 2°C (3.6°F) and limiting warming to 
1.5°C.23 To this end, the international community is trying to mobilize 
$100 billion a year in climate finance for developing countries and has 
just agreed to link the Green Climate Fund (GCF) with the Technology 
Mechanism to ramp up environmentally and socially sound climate 
responses going forward.24 
 
Tracking (1) the ways in which greenhouse gas reductions occur, (2) 
the quantity of reduction and (3) target dates by which reductions 
occur, combined with (4) sharing evolving best practices – together 
                                                                 
 20. See Paris Agreement, Art. 14, supra note 4, at 18-19. 
 21. See Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Summary of the Paris Climate Change 
Conference: 29 November – 13 December 2015, 12 INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEV. 1 (2015) http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12663e.pdf. 
 22. Suzanne Goldenberg, Climate Change: Will ‘1.5 to Stay Alive’ Deal be 
Enough to Save Seychelles? THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/12/climate-change-seychelles-
cop21-economy-collapse [http://perma.cc/Y37Y-PG8E]. 
 23. See Paris Agreement, Art. 4, supra note 4, at 23. 
 24. See, e.g., SZYMON MIKOLAJCZYK ET AL., LINKING THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT 
MECHANISM WITH THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND: MODELS FOR SCALING UP 
MITIGATION ACTION 1 (Climate Focus et al. eds., 2016) 
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can achieve climate mitigation. It can also guide adaptation and 
resilience through facilitative sharing of best practices and support. 
HIGH AMBITION RATCHETING ‘AS SOON AS POSSIBLE’ = INCREASING 
POLITICAL WILL 
The inclusion of the 1.5°C mitigation goal resulted in part from 
efforts of the 43-country coalition - Climate Vulnerable Forum well as 
the crucial addition of Brazil, Canada, the EU and the US to the newly 
gathered High Ambition Coalition.25 Clear long-term mitigation goals 
of 2°C and 1.5°C are to be reached through a binding but flexible 
hybrid approach that seeks to engage climate coordination. All parties 
contribute plans, report on progress towards meeting their plans in 
iterative international reviews, and strengthen their contributions in 
five-year cycles. The 12-page Paris Agreement sets forth goals, 
obligations, and general guidelines, while the 19-page COP 21 
Decision details practical elements and reference modalities that need 
to be fleshed out in forthcoming climate talks through the new Ad Hoc 
Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA).26 The APA is 
developing recommendations for modalities, procedures, and 
guidelines.27 
The hope that the Paris Agreement has infused into global dynamics 
is powerful. From a legal frame, the tools suited to reduce dangerous 
anthropogenic climate change are still being created. The Paris 
Agreement will be formally legally binding when it has been ratified 
by at least 55 countries representing 55 percent of global greenhouse 
gas emissions and enters into force.28 Even if the Paris Agreement 
comes into effect by 2020, general terms are still far more prevalent 
than sharp, clearly focused details such as specific rights and 
obligations. Under the UNFCCC the parties have drafted a new 
                                                                 
 25. See Matt McGrath, COP21: US Joins ‘High Ambition Coalition’ for Climate 
Deal, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2015) http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-
35057282 [http://perma.cc/A8Q2-N9VL]. 
 26. See Paris Agreement, supra note 4; see also COP 21 Decision, supra note 5, 
at 1. 
 27. See, e.g., Bonn Climate Change Conference - May 2017, UNITED NATIONS 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/meetings/
bonn_may_2017/meeting/10076.php. 
 28. See Paris Agreement, Art. 21, supra note 4, at 31. 
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framework agreement in need of a range of future substantive 
decisions to operationalize climate implementation.29 To peak 
greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible and balance sources and 
sinks in the second half of this century, long lasting broad participation 
needs to begin immediately. 
FOREST SINKS + ECOSYSTEM-BASED MITIGATION & ADAPTATION 
(ARTICLE 5) 
Nationally Determined Contributions can draw on the latest 
available UNFCCC and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) guidelines and methodologies and engage in ecosystem and 
biodiversity wise mitigation and adaptation decision-making that 
results in environmental and human integrity. Afforestation on 
degraded lands and wetlands can help balance greenhouse gas 
emissions and sinks. Facilitating environmentally and socially sound 
land use, forestry, agriculture best practices can contribute to rapidly 
decarbonizing the global economy by the middle of century.30 In 
particular, land-use sectors including agriculture and forests generally 
account for 25 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions.31 
Deforestation of tropical forests, core carbon-sequestering natural 
systems, can curb up to a third of global greenhouse gas emissions.32 
The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) notes that 
comprehensive coverage of greenhouse gas sources and sinks from all 
major economic sectors prevents double counting of emission 
reductions. Further, it recognizes and supports the “current role and 
                                                                 
 29. Preliminary Legal Assessment of the Paris Agreement, LEGAL RESPONSE 
INITIATIVE (Dec. 14, 2015), http://legalresponseinitiative.org/preliminary-legal-
assessment-of-the-paris-agreement/ [http://perma.cc/2Z74-FX8K]. 
 30. See Goldenberg, supra note 22. 
 31. Brittany Patterson, Trees Grow Taller in Climate Deal, but Financial 
Possibilities Shrink, CLIMATEWIRE (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/
climatewire/2015/12/14/stories/1060029450 [http://perma.cc/RN2U-QRPU] 
(noting that further finance is needed for “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and Forest Degradation, or REDD+, the U.N. program that can be used to reduce 
deforestation and land degradation”). 
 32. See id. 
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future potential of the land sector and all terrestrial, marine and coastal 
ecosystems as effective natural sinks and reservoirs.”33 
The Paris Agreement did not retain earlier draft language on 
“reaching greenhouse gas emissions neutrality in the second half of the 
century,” as a result of oil producer resistance – as a concession to 
OPEC states, final language leaves open some fossil fuels burning, as 
long overall emissions are absorbed by new forests and other sinks.34 
The final Article 5 states, 
In order to achieve the long-term temperature goal set out in 
Article 2, Parties aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse 
gas emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that peaking 
will take longer for developing country Parties, and to 
undertake rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with 
best available science, so as to achieve a balance between 
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks 
of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century, on the 
basis of equity, and in the context of sustainable 
development and efforts to eradicate poverty.35 
This signals that there is political will to facilitate offsetting 
emissions through forests sinks and other greenhouse gas reservoirs. 
Countries are encouraged to establish and strengthen policies to save 
remaining intact forests and to engage in state and non-state 
mobilization of support to help stop deforestation and support 
synergistic social integrity and nature based solutions. In one of the 
strongest recognitions of the importance of forests to date, reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation signals that 
sustainable forest stewardship can be a valuable investment. 
Conservation of existing and enhancement of new forests – as carbon 
                                                                 
 33. ICUN POSITION ON UNFCCC NEGOTIATIONS IN 2015, INTERNATIONAL 
UNION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE (2015), http://cmsdata.iucn.org/
downloads/eng_iucn_2015_position_paper_for_unfccc___final.pdf. 
 34. Sewell Chan, Key Points of the Paris Climate Pact, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/climate/2015-paris-climate-
talks/key-points-of-the-final-paris-climate-draft [http://perma.cc/4UTV-TKDW]. 
 35. Paris Agreement, Art. 4, supra note 4, at 22. 
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stocks and forest communities – opens the door to joint mitigation and 
adaptation.36 
SHORT TERM - NEXT STEPS 
A pre-2020 ambition mechanism rests upon substantial support 
materializing for effective greenhouse gas mitigation and climate 
adaptation. Additional action before 2020 is essential to keeping 
temperature rise well below 2°C.37 Participants at COP 21 lamented 
this mitigation gap and its corresponding adaptation gap. Interim 
action is included in the COP 21 Decision. Leading up to the Paris 
Agreement’s entry into force, parties are called upon to implement past 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) decisions and cancel emissions units issued therein.38 
Importantly, parties are called upon to ensure environmental integrity 
and transparently report internationally transferred mitigation 
outcomes, without seeking to double count any emission reductions.39 
The global community continues to call for an all hands on deck 
approach from developed countries and anyone else with the capacity 
to offer scaled up climate finance to support interim mitigation and 
adaptation.40 
The new linkage between support and environmentally sound 
technology sharing mechanisms can go a long way to actualizing 
climate mitigation and adaptation implementation. 
The universal nature of the Paris Agreement differs substantially 
from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC that required emissions 
reductions by developed countries listed in one annex while requesting 
                                                                 
 36. See Paris Agreement, Art. 5, supra note 4, at 23. 
 37. See, e.g., FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT (AR5), INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Apr. 9, 2008), https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/ 
[http://perma.cc/4RTP-6AEH]. 
 38. See COP 21 Decision, supra note 5, at 15. 
 39. See id. 
 40. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), 
BioRes Paris Update #3 ‘The End of a Journey, the Start of Another’ as Paris 
Agreement Adopted, BIORES (Dec. 13, 2015), http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/
biores/news/biores-paris-update-3-”the-end-of-a-journey-the-start-of-another”-as-
paris [http://perma.cc/Z7UW-7R8R]. 
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voluntary efforts by developing countries listed in a second annex.41 
In contrast to Kyoto, the Paris Agreement relies on the political will of 
respective parties to collectively offer ambitious climate action 
plans.42 This bottom up process that emerged in Copenhagen (2009)43 
was formalized in Cancun (2010)44 and has seen the submission of a 
range of voluntary targets by countries.45 Both the type and levels of 
discretion have been left to Parties, in contrast to the Kyoto Protocol 
(“top down”) approach. The Kyoto Protocol involved greater rigor but 
has seen a shrinking participation rate.46 As Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions (INDCs) are announced, the open question 
remains whether they will add up to the scientifically required climate 
response necessary to avert catastrophic levels of climate change. 
                                                                 
 41. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP1997/L.7/Add.1 (Dec. 10, 1997), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 
22 (1998); see also Elizabeth Burleson, Making Sand Castles as the Tide Comes In: 
Legal Aspects of Climate Justice, 2 GEO. WASH. J. OF ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 42 (2011) 
(in partnership with the Environmental Law Institute) [hereinafter Burleson, Legal 
Aspects of Climate Justice]; see also Elizabeth Burleson, Energy Revolution and 
Disaster Response in the Face of Climate Change, 22 VILL. ENVTL. L. J. 169 (2011) 
[hereinafter Burleson, Energy Revolution]; see also Elizabeth Burleson, Climate 
Change Consensus: Emerging International Law, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 543 (2010) [hereinafter Burleson, Climate Change Consensus]; see also 
Elizabeth Burleson, A Climate of Extremes: Transboundary Conflict Resolution, 32 
VT. L. REV. 477 (2008) [hereinafter Burleson, A Climate of Extremes]; see also 
Elizabeth Burleson, Multilateral Climate Change Mitigation, 41 U. OF S.F. L. REV. 
373 (2007). 
 42. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 41. 
 43. See UNFCCC, Conference of the Parties, 15th Sess., Report of the 
conference: Copenhagen Accord, Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7-19, 2009, U.N. DOC. 
FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (Mar. 30, 2010). 
 44. See UNFCCC, Draft Resolution, Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention, Cancun, Mex. Nov. 
29-Dec.10, 2010, U.N. DOC. FCCC/AWGLGA/2010/6.7 (Dec. 10, 2010). 
 45. See NDC Registry, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/focus/ndc_registry/items/9433.php. 
 46. Paris Agreement, supra note 4, at 2. The Paris Agreement Preamble 
highlights the continued importance of UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol leading up to 
Paris Agreement Implementation “[s]tressing the urgency of accelerating the 
implementation of the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol in order to enhance pre-
2020 ambition.” Id. 
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Currently, climate plans representing 95 percent of global 
greenhouse gas emissions have achieved broad participation.47 It 
remains to be seen whether this broad participation has come at the 
expense of capping global emissions at a safe threshold. Collective 
efforts will still result in an approximately 3°C temperature increase.48 
Currently insufficient ambition leaves a substantial post-2020 gap in 
meeting the temperature targets of 2°C let alone 1.5°C. Initial 
commitments are still further out than requisite for curbing dangerous 
climate change. Short-term support can bring down this climate curve 
and ease the long-term burden. Heavy lifting early on can be effective 
if parties take seriously that plans should involve at least a base 
unconditional commitment and optimize all available best practices as 
well as coordinating ramping up new best practices in a range of 
climate responses. Instead, whole sectors are still left off the table.49 
Short-term climate forcers as well as aviation and shipping remain 
areas where substantial ambition could be ratcheted up. 
NON-SECTORIAL APPROACH 
While 195 countries agreed to commit nearly all of the world’s 
countries to cut greenhouse gas emissions, substantial work remains to 
be carried out. For instance, sectorial emissions from shipping and 
aviation represent 5 percent of humanity’s greenhouse gas emissions 
but it remains an open question whether emissions should be tied to 
registration countries or the countries in which emissions actually 
                                                                 
 47. See NDC Registry, supra note 45, at 1. 
 48. Fiona Harvey, World on Track for 3C of Warming Under Current Global 
Climate Pledges, Warns UN, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/nov/03/world-on-track-for-3c-of-
warming-under-current-global-climate-pledges-warns-un [http://perma.cc/D5TW-
VDS4] (noting that “Current climate commitments are insufficient to reduce 
emissions by the amounts needed to avoid dangerous levels of global warming, says 
Unep report”). 
 49. See, e.g., Reducing Emissions from Aviation, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/index_en.htm [http://perma.cc/
LNR2-NBZM]; see also The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm [http://perma.cc/
929D-9CXA]. 
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occur.50 The Marshall Islands is one of the top three ship registries in 
the world, but is generally not the location where more than a minute 
fraction of greenhouse gases occurs.51 Regulating international trade 
and business transactions raises challenging questions such as where 
to account for rapidly increasing aviation and shipping emissions. 
Tough questions still need to be sorted out in future climate 
coordinating efforts. What is said and what is left unsaid remains 
important in differentiating responsibilities and following through 
with an effective climate response. 
MARKET MECHANISMS (COOPERATIVE MECHANISM) (ARTICLE 6) 
The ambitious goals of the Agreement, five-year review cycles, and 
transparency framework were heralded as significant signals to 
markets to encourage investments to be redirected to low greenhouse 
gas and climate-resilient sustainable development.52 
The Paris Agreement signals that markets are a viable 
implementation approach for countries to carry out climate plans. The 
Agreement introduces the new term, “internationally transferred 
mitigation outcomes” (ITMOs),53 to describe carbon currency and 
clearly states that a mechanism for ITMOs should be designed to 
mitigate rather than merely offset emissions. The Paris Agreement 
avoids reference to terminology of market-based approaches as a 
concession to countries against them. It also details that some of the 
reasons why market mechanisms are not favored need to be clearly 
avoided. Countries can transfer units of mitigation outcome to 
implement their Nationally Determined Contributions in a manner that 
ensures the avoidance of double counting. The caliber of emissions 
trading will depend on how robust the accounting guidelines for 
                                                                 
 50. See Benjamin Hulac, Rules for Ship, Airplane Emissions Left out of Paris 
Deal, CLIMATEWIRE (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2015/12/
14/stories/1060029447 [http://perma.cc/7YPP-UCXK]. 
 51. See, e.g., Marshall Islands, OFFICIAL GUIDE TO SHIP & YACHT REGISTRIES, 
https://www.guidetoshipregistries.com/shipregistries-country/marshall-islands 
[http://perma.cc/M9QU-CZQW]. 
 52. See Larry Light, Why U.S. Businesses Said “Stay in the Paris Accord,” CBS 
NEWS MONEYWATCH (June 2, 2017, 5:30 AM) http://www.cbsnews.com/news/
paris-climate-agreement-us-corporate-support/ [http://perma.cc/XDB8-TABE]. 
 53. See Paris Agreement, Art. 6.3, supra note 4, at 24. 
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Nationally Determined Contributions that are being developed prove 
to be in their implementation. The Paris Agreement establishes a new 
mechanism to succeed the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development 
Mechanism with rules to be adopted at the first meeting of parties after 
the Paris Agreement enters into force.54 The Clean Development 
Mechanism and other market mechanisms have been strongly 
criticized for not addressing environmental integrity and governance.55 
Importantly, the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC serving as 
the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement will be tasked with 
designing and implementing robust safeguards and learning from the 
design successes and problems of emissions trading to date. The Paris 
Agreement does not establish a cap-and-trade program given the lack 
of a legally binding emission reduction cap and the voluntary nature 
of Nationally Determined Contributions design. The Paris Agreement 
welcomes carbon market use to implement national climate plans 
without mandating participation or an overall emission cap.56 
United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon notes that, parties:  
[H]ave agreed to binding, robust, transparent rules of the 
road to ensure that all countries do what they have agreed 
across a range of issues. . . . With these elements in place, 
markets now have the clear signal they need to unleash the 
full force of human ingenuity and scale up investments that 
will generate low-emissions, resilient growth . . . .57  
It remains an open question how implementation will remain 
sustainable and seriously avoid hot spots.58 
                                                                 
 54. See id. 
 55. See ICSTD, supra note 40. 
 56. See Paris Agreement, Art. 6.3, supra note 4. 
 57. UN Chief Hails ‘Monumental’ COP21 Climate Deal, CLIMATE ACTION (Dec. 
14, 2015), 
http://www.climateactionprogramme.org/news/un_chief_hails_new_
cop21_climate_deal?utm_source=Feeds&utm_campaign=News&utm_medium=rss 
[http://perma.cc/L4YD-JAX6]. 
 58. See Paris Agreement, Art. 6.4(d), supra note 4, at 24. 
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ADAPTATION (ARTICLE 7) 
The Paris Agreement recognizes the need for adaptation efforts to 
be gender sensitive59 in establishing the adaptation goal of “enhancing 
adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability 
to climate change” that binds countries to engage with one another on 
adaptation planning as each party submits/updates cycles of 
accelerated adaptation implementation communications through five 
year stocktaking reviews.60 The global community still needs to flesh 
out how support will flow to developing countries for adaptation action 
in a clear and predictable manner. 
LOSS AND DAMAGE (ARTICLE 8)61 
Some of the most difficult sticking points in the Paris climate talks 
revolved around the reality that the poorest countries that have 
contributed the least to cause climate change face the most likely worst 
challenges as front line climate communities.62 In recognition of this, 
for the first time, developed countries in Paris agreed to include the 
following Paris Agreement freestanding Article 8 test stating, 
“[p]arties recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and 
addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of 
climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset 
events, and the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of 
loss and damage.”63 Recognizing loss and damage due to climate 
change acknowledges that some climate impacts are difficult or 
impossible to adapt to such as vanishing small island nation states 
losing all of their land. The free-standing Article 8 extends the Warsaw 
International Mechanism for Loss and Damage that established an 
interim body at COP 19 to start helping vulnerable countries establish 
                                                                 
 59. See Doelle, supra note 8. 
 60. See Paris Agreement, Art. 2, supra note 4, at 22. 
 61. See Paris Agreement, Art. 8, supra note 4, at 26. 
 62. See, e.g., Claire Doole, Climate Change Challenge, RED CROSS, 
http://www.redcross.int/EN/mag/magazine2007_1/4-9.html [http://perma.cc/HA38-
6X6E]. 
 63. See Paris Agreement Art. 8, supra note 4, at 26. 
16 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXVIII 
 
early warning systems, risk insurance, and other means of coping with 
climate change.64 
The Agreement’s Article 8 on Loss and Damage was core to acutely 
vulnerable countries, yet the core thorny issue is clarified in the 
accompanying Paris COP 21 Decision where Parties agree that loss 
and damage “does not involve or provide a basis for any liability of 
compensation.”65 It is the first time the term loss and damage has been 
included in an international agreement. It is a clear recognition of the 
impact of climate on the most vulnerable countries. High emitting 
countries stopped short of agreeing to liability/compensation for 
damage from rising global temperatures.66 At present, the existing 
language does not limit the Conference of the parties to the UNFCCC 
from extending its competencies under the Convention. It appears that 
parties have accepted that the rules on state responsibility for 
transboundary pollution are relevant to climate change. 
FINANCE (ARTICLE 9) – INFORMAL INFORMALS AND INDABA 
CONSENSUS BUILDING 
The Paris Agreement’s purpose is phrased as aspirational. 
UNFCCC’s common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities still exists but now leans towards national self-
differentiation rather than developed and developing country annexes. 
Parties do reference “in light of different national circumstances” in 
reinterpreting existing UNFCCC and Kyoto commitments for instance 
in mobilizing finance and technology transfer.67 
As at past climate talks, finance was a tough substantive element to 
resolve in Paris.  Less well-resourced developing countries calling for 
robust support to be scaled up met with developed country calls for 
                                                                 
 64. Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with 
Climate Change Impacts, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/adaptation/workstreams/loss_and_damage/items/
8134.php [http://perma.cc/TS9S-QPGF]. 
 65. COP 21 Decision, supra note 5, at ¶ 51 (“Agrees that Article 8 of the 
Agreement does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation”). 
 66. C. Davenport et al., Inside the Paris Climate Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/12/12/world/paris-climate-
change-deal-explainer.html?module=ConversationPieces&region
=Body&action=click&pgtype=article&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/OGJ8-W9AB]. 
 67. Legal Response Initiative, supra note 29. 
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large emerging developing countries to make contributions in addition 
to developed countries. A give and take occurred in Paris with the Paris 
Agreement calling for developed countries to help finance mitigation 
and adaptation in developing countries under the existing UNFCCC. 
The United States sought the latter to avoid new binding financial 
obligations needing congressional approval. At the same time, the 
Paris Agreement encourages other parties to provide support 
voluntarily.68 
Discussions circled around how to ramp up finance beyond $100 
billion a year and over what timeframe parties could plausibly 
mobilize and review support.69 The COP 21 Decision pushes the 
timeframe for mobilizing the $100 billion-a-year goal out through 
2025.70 Beyond 2025, it remains an open question what support looks 
like for meeting the myriad of climate challenges. Parties have simply 
agreed that by 2025 the COP will set a new collective quantified goal 
from a floor of $100 billion a year.71 Every two years, developed 
countries commit to submit quantitative and qualitative information on 
future support, while other countries are encouraged to do so 
voluntarily.72 
Developing countries have referenced developed country party 
duties to provide support under UNFCCC Article 4.73 Technology 
transfer and monetary support have not materialized on the scale 
envisioned by the drafters of the UNFCCC. The Paris Agreement 
references charitable giving from a wide variety of sources and even 
the USD $100 billion target is only referenced in the COP 21 Decision 
rather than the Paris Agreement.74 The Meeting of Parties to the Paris 
Agreement will set a new goal on finance that is above the base level 
of USD $100 billion.75 This is to occur prior to 2025.76 
                                                                 
 68. See NDC Registry, supra note 45. 
 69. See generally, Janet E. Milne, Storms Ahead: Climate Change Adaptation 
Calls for Resilient Funding, 39 VT. L. REV. 819 (2015). 
 70. See COP 21 Decision, supra note 5, at 8. 
 71. See Paris Agreement, supra note 4, at 26. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See UNFCCC Art. 4, supra note 19. 
 74. See COP 21 Decision, supra note 5, at 54. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. 
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It remains an open question the degree to which public and private 
funding pledges announced at the launch of the Paris COP 21 climate 
talks can keep climate finance on track to reach the $100 billion goal 
by 2020.  Similarly, pledges to the Least Developed Countries Fund 
are growing and raising the profile of adaptation finance and need to 
provide public finance for both mitigation and adaptation. Serious 
shortcomings remain regarding when and how to shift investments 
away from high-emission activities.  Global stocktake participants are 
tasked with engaging the global community in actually increasing 
support that is adequate to the challenge of transitioning global energy 
production away from high emission and toward environmentally and 
socially sound climate solutions.77 
The facilitative dialogue to take stock in 2018 is tasked with the 
heavy lifting of nationally determined contributions matching required 
reductions in global temperatures. 
The construct that there are fixed developed and developing 
countries continue to evolve into dynamic country consensus building 
gatherings. The recently congregated High Ambition Coalition 
brought together small island nation states with some of the largest 
developed country emitting parties to point out to large developing 
countries. COP 21 participants from vulnerable small islands pointed 
out to large emitting countries that “[y]our right to pull people out of 
poverty doesn’t negate my right to survival.”78 India, in particular 
gained mixed reactions as the international community recognized its 
solar target and leadership but challenged its coal plans.79 Fiona 
Harvey notes, 
Whatever climate agreement emerges from the international 
negotiations in Paris may stem from the most casual of talks 
                                                                 
 77. See Paris Agreement, supra note 4, at 26. 
 78. Lisa Friedman, India’s Position Becomes a Challenge as Substantive Climate 
Talks on Finances Begin, CLIMATEWIRE (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/
climatewire/2015/12/02/stories/1060028805 [http://perma.cc/J5T4-C94T]. 
 79. Arthur Neslen, India Unveils Global Solar Alliance of 120 countries at Paris 
Climate Summit, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2015/nov/30/india-set-to-unveil-global-solar-alliance-of-120-
countries-at-paris-climate-summit [http://perma.cc/HD9L-K536] (“Narendra Modi 
announces a new alliance of nations and industry on large-scale expansion of solar 
energy use in the tropics and beyond”). 
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between nations. So-called ‘informal informals’—when 
delegates huddle on the floor in hallways, crowd around 
phones at cafe tables or hunker down however they can—
can help resolve differences more quickly than formal talks, 
officials say. At these talks, negotiators can work out 
wording and forge consensus in small groups that they can 
then work into formal negotiations.80 
The High Ambition Coalition reminder “1.5 to stay alive” gained 
acceptance from being nearly taboo in serious discussion leading up to 
Paris to gaining broad credence among African, Caribbean and Pacific 
nations.  Then United States joined the High Ambition Coalition, 
followed by Canada, Australia and Brazil. These developed oil 
producing nations entering the plenary hall with the Marshall Islands 
shook up the dynamics of the developing nation negotiating bloc.81  
Interestingly, several strategic advisors for small island nations come 
from developed countries, further driving climate consensus building 
in dynamic directions. 
By the end of the Paris climate talks, parties broadly agreed to five-
year global stocktake cycles to facilitate iterative monitoring of 
implementation and provide tailored recommendations for enhancing 
each countries approach.  This process can begin immediately. Each 
party can submit updated plans when they submit the instrument of 
ratification of the Paris Agreement. Parties can enhance ambition 
levels at any time. 
Beyond agreeing to review every five years starting in 2018 before 
the Paris Agreement enters into force, parties have yet to hammer out 
the detailed modalities of such reviews. They will do so through a non-
punitive, facilitative implementation committee.82 This means that no 
sanctions will be applied if a country does not fulfill its contribution. 
Countries with more constrained capacities are to receive broad global 
support to implement their national contributions.83 
                                                                 
 80. Fiona Harvey, ‘Informal informals’ May Hold Key to Paris Deal, 
CLIMATEWIRE (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2015/12/02/
stories/1060028822 [http://perma.cc/RYV9-WFQL]. 
 81. Author’s personal observation while attending the Paris Climate Conference. 
 82. See Paris Agreement, Art. 15, supra note 4, at 29. 
 83. See id. 
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The recent first round of submitting Nationally Determined 
Contributions demonstrated the level of assistance that many countries 
still need in determining their current and future emission and to 
specify what ratio of ecosystem, efficiency, and other environmentally 
sound technology solutions could facilitate the highest level of 
ambition for each country.84 Environmentally and socially sound tech 
and nature-based solutions abound and are becoming increasingly 
wide spread.85 They are economically viable ways to reduce emissions 
and raise resilience.  With the fleshing out of accounting guidelines by 
the Conference of the Parties, global stocktake reviews can clarify the 
dynamics of flows of support as countries report finance biannually 
using soon to be established accounting guidelines. 
Country submissions relating to finance and technology will be 
reviewed by technical experts with an eye for ways of improving 
clarity and offering an opportunity to share best practices among 
climate plan approaches.  The transparency and accounting blueprint 
that the Paris Agreement sketches can help parties implement robust 
yet flexible climate responses mindful of the dynamic range of 
capabilities and geographies relevant to climate strategies.86 
TECHNOLOGY MECHANISM (ARTICLE 10) 
The COP 21 Decision strengthens the Technology Mechanism (TM) 
and establishes a new technology framework to provide overarching 
guidance.  Ongoing efforts continue among state and non-state actors 
to enhance enabling environments and reduce barriers to development 
and transfer of socially and environmentally sound technologies.87 
                                                                 
 84. See Burleson, Legal Aspects Of Climate Justice, supra note 41; see also 
Burleson, Energy Revolution, supra note 41; see also Burleson Climate Change 
Consensus, supra note 41; see also Burleson, A Climate of Extremes, supra note 41; 
see also Burleson, Multilateral Climate Change Mitigation, supra note 41. 
 85. See, e.g., CLIMATE TECHNOLOGY CENTRE & NETWORK, https://www.ctc-
n.org (last visited May 23, 2016). 
 86. See, e.g., TT: CLEAR, THE UNFCCC TECHNOLOGY CLEARING HOUSE, 
http://unfccc.int/ttclear/ (last visited May 23, 2016). 
 87. E.g., BURLESON INSTITUTE, www.BurlesonInstitute.org (last visited May 23, 
2016) (providing one portal into Climate Technology Networking on the part of 
members of this global alliance to share best practices as environmentally sound 
technology evolves). 
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Linking the Technology Mechanism and UNFCCC financial bodies 
– combined with iterative reviews detailing effectiveness and scale of 
support to the Technology Mechanism – may be able to help raise the 
funds needed with which to broadly ramp up renewables and other 
innovations.88 
The Cancun Agreements established the Technology Mechanism 
that became operational in 2012.89 This dynamic public-private 
innovation hub and network advises developing countries upon 
request.90 This author has been among the advisors facilitating joint 
research and development, and environmentally sound diffusion 
efforts. This work has been done through the Climate Technology 
Centre and Network (CTCN) work implementing Technology 
Mechanism by responding to requests from developing country parties 
on matters related to development and tech sharing. The corresponding 
Technology Executive Committee (TEC) provides overarching policy 
coordination for the technology framework – supporting developing 
countries to specify and share technology needs and evolving best 
practices. 
UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres explains that the 
global community has most of the technology that we need to address 
climate change as well as the capital: 
We’re moving on the policy. We just need to focus and 
understand the urgency of this. And yes, I do think that we, 
as humanity, will be able to address this challenge . . . 
                                                                 
 88. See ICTSD supra note 40. 
 89. See Support, TT: CLEAR, THE UNFCCC TECHNOLOGY CLEARING HOUSE, 
http://unfccc.int/ttclear/support/technology-mechanism.html (noting that The CTCN 
is the implementation body of the Technology Mechanism). CTCN “facilitates the 
transfer of technologies through three core services: (1) Providing technical 
assistance at the request of developing countries to accelerate the transfer of climate 
technologies; (2) Creating access to information and knowledge on climate 
technologies, particularly through its knowledge management system; and (3) 
Fostering collaboration among climate technology stakeholders via its network of 
regional and sectoral experts.” Id. 
 90. Support, Nationally Designated Entities by country, TT: CLEAR, THE 
UNFCCC TECHNOLOGY CLEARING HOUSE, http://unfccc.int/ttclear/support/
national-designated-entity.html [http://perma.cc/] (noting that requests can be made 
through Nationally Designated Entities via secretariat@unfccc.int and 
ttclear@unfccc.int). 
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[parties] can see that this actually gives them much better air 
quality. It gives them better transportation. It gives them 
better food security, water security because they are 
understanding that we can no longer continue down the path 
of increasing the risk of non-action.91 
Transfer and development of environmentally and socially sound 
technology can be enhanced through sharing existing expertise as well 
as engaging in collaborative breakout endeavors to advance beyond 
existing energy, resilience, and related climate strategies. 
Strengthened technical examination process (TEP) on mitigation 
can enhance developing country expert involvement, enhancing 
state/non-state actor engagement through formalized technology and 
financial mechanisms of the UNFCCC. 
Furthermore, the new technical examination process TEP on 
adaptation, allows network linking to build on the dialogue to achieve 
solutions spaces, innovation hubs, and broad dissemination of 
environmentally friendly technologies and practices that meaningfully 
address the broad swath of climate change ramifications. 
CAPACITY BUILDING (ARTICLE 11) 
The COP 21 Decision creates a new capacity-building initiative for 
transparency, to facilitate developing country transparency follow 
through. Parties agreed that all parties other than least developed 
countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS) should 
share information on adaptation, loss and damage, finance, and 
technology. These submissions should occur every other year.92 
Throughout the climate talks, differentiation of country 
responsibilities remains a thorny issue as developed countries urge 
everyone to take on a single transparency system while India, China, 
and a range of other developing countries urge clear differentiation that 
                                                                 
 91. U.N. Chief: Paris Convention Represents ‘Turning Point’ In Climate Policy, 
NPR (Nov. 23, 2015, 4:25 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/11/23/457139688/u-n-
chief-paris-convention-represents-turning-point-in-climate-policy?utm_medium=
RSS&utm_campaign=environment [https://perma.cc/ZX7J-EAH4]. 
 92. See COP 21 Decision, Art. 11, supra note 5. 
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would require robust transparency and compliance for developed 
countries and self-assessment for developing countries. 
Paris consensus settled on a single overarching transparency 
framework with subtle differentiation that offers flexibility and 
support to developing countries. Once detailed guidance has been 
fleshed out, it will be easier to speak to the capacity of the transparency 
framework to effectively and equitably address climate change at the 
requisite pace to avert catastrophic climate impacts. 
PROCEDURAL RIGHTS TO PARTICIPATION + (ARTICLE 12) 
A world record 150 country leaders launched landmark climate talks 
in Paris.93 As they left and the hard give and take of removing brackets 
from draft text proceeded, chipper folk gave away apples and 
chocolate to participants hunkering down at the Le Bourget Airport, 
just outside Paris.94 Drippy moss panels offered a bit of greenery as 
youth with 1.5°C painted on their faces silently held devastatingly 
simple messages explaining the cavernous disconnect between 
business as usual and requisite climate coordination. Round the clock 
negotiations culminated in an outcome far more vague then necessary 
but far more detailed than anticipated. Closing the mitigation, 
adaptation, support, and technology sharing gap(s) is now left to the 
global community with a few more tools with which to start doing the 
heavy lifting. 
The Paris climate talks infused the process with “political will and a 
spirit of unity.”95 The Paris Agreement set clear, long-term and short-
term signals that the global community will gather regularly to 
increase ambition. The Agreement marks consensus on transparency 
and verification that parties will implement their commitments. 
                                                                 
 93. See UNFCC, Status Agreement Tracker, supra note 19; see also ENB 
Coverage of Climate and Atmosphere Meetings, IISD REPORTING SERVICES, 
http://enb.iisd.org/process/climate_atm.htm. [http://perma.cc/PJ4B-V34S]. 
 94. See, e.g., SUMMARY OF THE PARIS CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE: 29 
NOVEMBER-13 DECEMBER 2015, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN 1(International 
Institute for Sustainable Development ed., 2015) http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/
enb12663e.pdf. 
 95. Fiona Harvey, World Bank President Celebrates ‘Game Changer’ Paris 
Talks, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/
dec/13/world-bank-president-celebrates-game-changer-paris-talks 
[http://perma.cc/AC2L-J62L]. 
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Mobilizing support for the poorest, most vulnerable countries to adapt 
is underway, albeit slowly. Gathering in climate forums provides state 
and non-state actor engagement with which to share best practices, 
build capacity, peer pressure collective action on mitigation and 
adaptation, and understand ways to effectively and equitably address 
micro/macro climate challenges.96 
NGO participation has been integral to climate consensus building.97 
The core agreement reaffirms the commitment of parties to public 
participation, access to information, education, and climate awareness 
under UNFCCC Article 6 and the new Paris Agreement Article 12. 
Paris transparency measures should help verify that countries 
actually curb greenhouse gas emissions. Implementation remains an 
open question. If Nationally Determined Contributions are neither 
legally binding nor collectively ambitious then it is a misnomer to say 
that climate mitigation implementation is effective. If the goal setting 
dialogue itself can increase the ambition of Paris Agreement Parties 
then step by step climate action can build momentum, which is a far 
cry from kicking any action down the road for a subsequent conference 
of the parties gathering in some new venue each year. 
The Paris Agreement references efforts to limit global average 
temperature rise to 1.5°C with a peaking of emissions as soon as 
possible. This is becoming increasingly within the political willpower 
of parties because a substantial exchange of information and best 
practices has increased understanding that anthropogenic emissions 
and removals by sinks can reach net-zero emissions.98 Once state and 
non-state actors engaged to the point of believing this achievable, it 
became politically feasible to state such a shared vision within the 
Paris Agreement. This is being heralded as far more ambitious than 
many expected the Agreement to reference. The reasons for this appear 
to range from climate catastrophes coming fast and furiously globally, 
finance increasingly being mobilized to respond, and responses 
increasingly being ramped up to cost effective, economy wide 
                                                                 
 96. See, e.g., Daniel Bodanskya1, The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New 
Hope? 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 288 (2016). 
 97. See, e.g., CLIMATE NETWORK, http://www.climatenetwork.org (last visited 
May 23, 2016). The collective efforts of many non-governmental organizations and 
the dedicated individuals that help sustain civil society public participation at an 
unprecedented scale and scope. Id. 
 98. See IPCC, Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), supra note 37. 
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solutions. Where there is a way, a path, a shared vision that multilateral 
engagement can implement at all levels – then political momentum 
will follow. If the people lead, the leaders will follow. If the leaders 
lead, the people will engage. It is a recipe of vibrant synergistic state 
and non-state actor engagement that goes well beyond conference 
semantics and political rhetoric. 
Five-year reviews create a means by which to shine a spotlight on 
developed countries to increase meaningful support to developing 
country mitigation and adaptation implementation. Global state and 
non-state actor stocktakes can also highlight where countries with 
conditions placed on their plans could remove these question marks 
and actually reduce emissions, enhance sinks, and support 
adaptation/resilience. 
TRANSPARENCY (PEER REVIEW) 
Yet, the lack of uniformity among pledge types makes comparison 
difficult, and estimating the aggregate effect of greenhouse gas 
emission reductions a moving target. Two nongovernmental 
organizations have stepped into this space and are providing 
substantial clarity. Climate Tracker and the World Resources Institute 
are calculating collective climate governance projections and those 
seeking to contribute minimally are more easily spotted as public and 
private climate response ambitions are ratcheted up globally.99 
By the end of the Paris climate talks, 186 submitted plans detailed 
how parties committed to lowering greenhouse gas emissions through 
2025 or 2030.100 Collectively these plans represent over 95 percent of 
global emissions.101 The Paris Agreement now requires all countries to 
submit updates to these plans that would ratchet up the stringency of 
emissions by 2020 and every five years thereafter, a time frame that 
the United States and the European Union urged.102 India had initially 
sought a 10-year review cycle.103 
                                                                 
 99. See CAIT CLIMATE DATA EXPLORER, supra note 9; see also CLIMATE 
ACTION TRACKER, http://climateactiontracker.org/indcs.html (last visited May 23, 
2016). 
 100. See NDC Registry, supra note 45. 
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 102. See Chan, supra note 34. 
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The trifurcated transparency framework legally-binds all parties to 
reporting requirements, acknowledging that developing countries’ 
need support and that small island nation states and least developed 
countries need additional capacity building assistance.104 Support 
bifurcated between developed countries that shall provide financial 
resources, and other countries that are encouraged to provide such 
support voluntarily.105 
Furthermore, Parties are prohibited from making individual 
reservations to the Paris Agreement.106 
NEXT STEPS: NOW THE HARD PART 
The Paris Agreement sends a powerful signal to the many 
thousands of cities, regions, businesses and citizens across 
the world already committed to climate action that their 
vision of a low-carbon, resilient future is now the chosen 
course for humanity this century. —UNFCCC Chair 
Figueres.107  
Through the Paris Agreement, parties seek to provide a global 
support structure for commitments to become stronger over time. 
The path from Paris is to be facilitative rather than punitive.  At the 
same time, nature itself does not negotiate and may not be as flexible 
as governance participants. Irrespective of stick, carrot, or [insert one’s 
own most effective approach], it is incumbent upon the international 
community generally, and those global citizens seeking a stable 
climate going forward to coordinate rapid and substantial greenhouse 
gas reductions. Negative emissions such as forest sinks need to balance 
population growth and any energy intensification that increases 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. 
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Recap: the Paris Agreement, negotiated within the dynamic climate 
gatherings of the UNFCCC, sets forth the purpose to hold the increase 
in the global average temperature to “well below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase 
to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.”108 Furthermore, it aims to 
facilitate as much greenhouse gas leaving the atmosphere as entering 
it in the second half of the twenty-first century.  Means of 
implementation include integrating sustained finance, environmentally 
and socially sound tech sharing and capacity building engagement. 
Christiana Figueres voiced what many participants have believed – 
“the Paris [A]greement is 10 years too late.”109 At the same time, she 
also voiced the optimism with which the international community sees 
the balancing of sinks and sources as achievable. She highlighted that 
switching to renewables has become increasingly viable as solar has 
become 80 percent and wind 40 percent less expensive since 2008.110 
Participants in the Paris climate talks spent much of the conference 
engaged in the several decades long complex process of sifting through 
dense texts with layer upon layer of noncommittal bracketed text.  The 
Washington Post reported mid conference “Upon this, it seems, does 
the fate of the planet depend.”111 
Why do people cooperate? One reason people cooperate is as a result 
of shared norms. 
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Much of the past decade has been spent seeking a shared vision with 
which to build a legally binding climate agreement. Cooperating 
around shared norms can occur as a result of meme evolution.112 It can 
also result from ancient understandings of reciprocity and 
sustainability.113 New technologies offer the global community an 
opportunity to evolve norms regarding use of a given technology. 
Energy siting discussions merge innovation and resilience 
arguments.114 Regarding ancient collective wisdom, indigenous 
peoples meaningful involvement in climate decision-making can 
contribute to dynamic network governance that shares best 
practices.115 
The climate talks under the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change have involved unprecedented engagement among 
national, subnational, supranational, tribal, scientific, private sector, 
and public interest civil society participants. This author has discussed 
these developments at length in earlier works.116 This Article will 
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sketch tribal climate dynamics that have engaged global climate-
energy-water decision-making. 
Capacity building is core to addressing the climate challenge.117 
States engage with non-state actors in large part because neither have 
the capacity outright to provide governance without coordinating 
among jurisdictions and areas of competency. 
Climate change impacts due process, equal protection, and civil 
rights to lives and property. 118 Environmental and human rights 
interests are at odds in forestry contexts leaving climate negotiations 
stymied to equitably protect carbon sinks such as rain forests without 
disregarding indigenous land rights.119 REDD+ negotiations have 
pitted articulate environmental NGOS against eloquent tribal leaders. 
In the past several years this debate catapulted from obscure to of 
central interest to much of civil society participants at conference of 
the party proceedings.120 
Those engaging with nation states at the climate talks need to be as 
transparent, representative, and equitable as the nation states 
representatives. A human right does not become less humane or less 
of a right because there is a new energy interest involved. Tribal 
communities are at the crossroads of traditional and renewable energy 
decisions and need to be engaged with in a manner that is mindful of 
sovereign resource legal rights and centuries of environmental 
experience. 
Subsistence natural resource use overlaps with climate sink/source 
balancing endeavors.  Blue Carbon for instance is the umbrella term 
that has come to be recognized as encompassing a range of ways in 
which coastal and ocean sequestration of greenhouse gases can offset 
continued use of fossil fuels.121 Yet, coastal communities generally, 
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and tribal communities in particular rely heavily upon these forests.122 
Coastal mangroves can provide mitigation and adaptation measures. 
Mangroves also sustain communities many of whom do not want their 
ways of life to be sacrificed for well off individuals and groups to 
benefit from continued greenhouse gas emissions at the expense of 
communities being able to use areas that they have come to rely upon 
and may have land tenure to but that also have the capacity to provide 
climate sinks. 
Isle de Jean Charles exemplifies a tribal relocation endeavor in the 
face of sea level rise along the Gulf Coast of Louisiana.123 It remains 
an open question to what degree indigenous communities will be 
required to continue to accommodate other groups of people, both near 
and far, in climate mitigation and adaptation. 
Climate migration has its dynamic elements. It remains unclear to 
what degree communities that are not faced with front line sea level 
rise but are in prime locations for carbon market trading of sink and 
source “projects” will need to relocate or reduce their use of local 
natural resources to make way for climate endeavors. 
Transcending glacial politics to achieve innovation and climate-
energy equity is a multifaceted diplomacy challenge. Migration may 
be advantageous to communities whose land will disappear outright 
but not for communities that have traditionally utilized green and blue 
carbon sinks as subsistence inhabitants of forests and coastal 
mangroves. Representatives from many of these locations have come 
to the climate talks as non-state actor observers to the nation-state 
decision-making process to share perspectives and seek that 
indigenous rights remain within final outcome texts. 
Esau Sinnok came to the Paris climate talks as an 18-year-old tribal 
representative from Shishmaref in Alaska. He shared his perspective 
with the media and world leaders, explaining that his community’s 
island is soon to be swallowed up by the sea and ice forms later in the 
winter impacting subsistence food security. Sinnok and other members 
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of front line communities offer a heightened level of urgency to 
coordinate climate responses.124 
Over the past several decades, the climate talks have involved 
inclusive treaty body decision-making.125 This has not occurred within 
a scientifically viable timeframe with which to avert critical climate 
change. Yet, it has advanced global governance engagement and 
involved unprecedented interactions among state and non-state actors. 
Tribal, academic, youth, gender, and other groups have networked – 
sharing research and analysis.126 These and their state counterparts 
have compared and contrasted climate options in a myriad of 
forums.127 
Treaty language sets boundaries and textual anchors while treaty 
negotiating records can provide evidence of intent. The Paris 
Agreement acceptance linking emissions mitigation mechanism 
(EMM) widens the dialogue as to how to implement broad and 
effective climate mitigation and adaptation endeavors in an equitable 
manner.128 
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Climate taxes and markets can reduce greenhouse gases as can 
strictly enforced regulation. Entities such as the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) are in a strong position to 
enforce rules on flaring and leakage from hydraulic fracturing for 
instance. Each of these incentive approaches remains salient and has 
its equity pros and cons. Taxes clarify the cost of reducing a unit of 
greenhouse gas but do not mandate a given quantity of reduction. This 
leads to the problem of actors simply internalizing the cost of the tax 
into the cost of operation rather than being forced to actually reduce 
emissions if they can afford not to. Markets can set strict caps on 
emissions but the cost of a given unit of emissions reduction rises and 
falls with supply and demand for emitting. Bans can also reduce 
emissions by a set amount but do not generate a revenue stream with 
which to carry out reductions. Environmental economics has 
developed with regard to sulfur dioxide, fishing, and carbon permits. 
Concentrations of emission and rights have been an equity concern in 
each context. Hot spots of concentrated pollution may not impact 
global warming in regional ways but do impact individuals with 
individual human rights in disparate ways. Indigenous communities 
live close to the land more so than many other peoples. Their lives and 
livelihoods are at stake in global decisions to use forests and other 
sinks to balance greenhouse gas emissions. 
Without nation state status, tribes, cities and other jurisdictions 
within the borders of nation states participated in climate talks with 
NGO badges. While this is a contradiction in terms, they came as 
nongovernmental organizations for the purposes of the conference of 
the parties’ climate negotiations. Each registered and received a badge 
permitting the entity to access events with observer status. That said 
many provided substantial contributions by holding side events that 
compared and contrasted evolving best practices underway around the 
world.129 
Those with aligned interests gathered to form groups that had the 
capacity to strengthen their outreach initiatives among the larger body 
of climate talks participants. Even hallways regularly became brief 
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reception areas for participants of all badge stripes to exchange 
perspectives and engage with government delegates and journalists. 
To date, the EU has set among the most ambitious targets leading up 
to 2020 with reductions of 20 percent from 1990 levels and has already 
achieved a 19 percent reduction in greenhouse gases from those 
levels.130 Clearly the EU has had more resources with which to make 
these commitments than least developed countries. Where lessons 
have been learned they can be shared and Paris Agreement processes 
of engagement can build upon evolving best practices across the range 
of climate matrix elements. 
The 2015 Paris consensus recognizes the importance of providing 
broadly agreed upon diplomatic tools to mitigate, adapt, and support 
increased ambition. As blue printing goes, the Paris Agreement has 
provided a rough sketch of the requisite climate action yet to be 
accomplished. With the established binding commitments by all 
parties to submit and implement Nationally Determined Contributions 
countries will be able to regularly compare mitigation, adaptation, and 
support in a process of global review.131 Ratcheting up ambition every 
five years still requires support, yet the finance goal of mobilizing 
$100 billion by 2020 has now stretched to 2025 and any loss and 
damage recognition does not provide a basis for liability or 
compensation. Funding can flow through cap and trade that does not 
double count emissions reductions internationally. In the tradition of 
the Clean Development Mechanism, a new mechanism will facilitate 
international emission trading to reduce greenhouse gases. 
As UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon notes, “the work starts 
now.”132 Paris climate consensus building has approached problem 
solving as a facilitative rather than punitive process of sustained 
engagement.133 Parties have gathered national commitments into an 
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international instrument with legal effect and placed some strategic 
stepping-stones, if not a robust foundation, for policy coordination.134 
Yet, efforts to have gender equity, human rights, intergenerational 
equity, etc. in the operative language fell short, as did liability and 
compensation for loss and damage. Landing zones were also never 
agreed upon for establishing a top down element to the 5-year stock 
taking cycles and inclusion of international shipping and aviation also 
failed to occur in Paris, as did efforts to state a peak year and point at 
which emissions and sinks would balance each other let alone a point 
by which 1.5°C or even 2°C temperature goals would be met. These 
are serious omissions. Yet given the trajectory of climate talks, the 
Paris Agreement marks a diplomatic breakthrough to agree upon 
legally binding processes. This was a breakthrough that was a long 
time in coming and for which much diplomatic engagement occurred 
to find consensus. 
Paris Climate Conference participants facilitated global agreement 
on important core elements of a climate regime, including cycles of 
nationally determined contributions reporting, review, and ratcheting 
up stocktaking updates. Detailed reporting and review rules remain an 
open question for future climate talks. Climate cooperation “by all 
Parties and non-Party stakeholders, including civil society, the private 
sector, financial institutions, cities and other subnational authorities, 
local communities and indigenous peoples,” are helping ratchet up 
ambition and implementation of mitigation, adaptation, support, 
technology sharing, and the myriad other elements of the evolving 
global climate response. Next steps for climate action include: (1) five 
year reviews to increase commitments to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions and collectively adapt to climate changes; (2) rigorous 
transparency/ accountability for governments to stay on track with 
their commitments; and (3) support to poor nations to adapt and adopt 
environmentally and socially sound energy and resilience 
technologies. Universal agreement and broad country climate plan 
implementation signals robust innovation, investments, and 
sustainable development opportunities globally. 
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The Paris climate summit sends a SOS signal for broad, effective 
climate action. Regions within nation-state borders are well positioned 
to respond to this SOS call with rapid and effective climate 
implementation.135 The International Indigenous People’s Forum on 
Climate Change has offered amendment language to the negotiating 
text calling for recognition of indigenous cultural knowledge and the 
use of a bottom-up engagement that meaningfully involves the 
advance consent of affected communities.136 Dynamic depth of field is 
within the capacity of not only nation states but also within the 
capacity of sub and supra groupings that have made contributions to 
coordinating complex climate change challenges. We have all been 
participant observers of the climate crisis. We can all participate in 
multidimensional problem solving to balance sinks and sources. 
 
While international law is a young enterprise as human endeavors 
go, it is not robust enough to regulate strict climate-energy adherence 
to a detailed legal regime. The current approach is a facilitative rather 
than punitive one, relying on the sharing of best practices. For this 
approach to effectively and equitably respond to climate change, 
greater dynamic governance engagement is called for. Arguably, that 
engagement can build upon the traditional wisdom, resilience, and 
innovation of the world’s indigenous communities. That is not to say 
that they should hold the weight of the world on their shoulders any 
more than anyone else, albeit they are in some of the most vulnerable 
front line climate communities. Rather, indigenous engagement in 
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climate-energy-water governance can substantially advance climate 
coordination.137 
Climate coordination involves energy security that is mindful of 
environmental integrity and human rights. Tribes have shown climate 
leadership.138 As front line communities many have come together to 
play a catalytic role in global recognition of the 1.5°C challenge. Tribal 
communities are at the crossroads of traditional and renewable energy 
decisions and need to be engaged with respect and in a manner that is 
mindful of sovereign resource legal rights and centuries of 
environmental experience. 
Latin American natural resource use has increasingly impacted 
indigenous lives and livelihoods. Greater global understanding and 
broad willingness to defending human rights defenders is long 
overdue. The climate talks may be a slow, deliberative process but the 
means are important in their own right. Stalling climate mitigation 
measures because money can be made in fossil fuel extraction is not a 
justification for lengthy deliberations. Genuinely understanding a 
broad range of climate-energy-water perspectives in an economic-
social-environmental sustainability governance matrix is worth 
deliberative Indabas and other exchanges.139 
Indigenous lives and livelihoods need not be the casualties of 
climate coordination globally. It should not take brave indigenous 
women losing their lives for governments to investigate corporate 
illegal behavior. Death threats by corporate employees against 
indigenous community members need to be addressed by authorities 
consistently and not merely when national aid packages are at stake as 
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occurred in the recent Central American murder of Berta Cáceres.140  
Honduras authorities have recently arrested four men in connection 
with the murder of indigenous environmental and human rights 
defender Berta Cáceres.141 Two of the men are connected to the 
company building the Zarca Dam that Cáceres opposed. The company 
Desarrollos Energéticos SA (DESA) seeks to dam the Gualcarque 
River – considered sacred to the Lenca indigenous community. Sergio 
Ramón Rodriguez, the dam’s engineer, and Douglas Geovanny 
Bustillo, the former head of DESA’s security, had threatened to kill 
Cáceres.142 
This is not an isolated incident and should not be a one off effort at 
pursuing justice. Climate change impacts due process, equal 
protection, and civil rights to lives and property. Environmental and 
human rights interests are at odds in forestry and water contexts, 
leaving climate negotiators the careful challenge to equitably protect 
carbon sinks such as rain forests without disregarding indigenous land 
rights. 
REDD+ negotiations have pitted articulate environmental NGOS 
against eloquent tribal leaders. In the past several years this debate 
catapulted from obscure to of central interest to much of civil society 
participants at conference of the party proceedings. 
The social license to operate is related to the social cost of carbon 
and each become more well recognized with climate outreach that 
continuously and clearly articulates the opportunity costs of engaging 
in a given activity – be it natural resource extraction or subsistence 
livelihoods. 
No one is called upon to live in terror. Terrorism and civil unrest 
arise out of desperation. Paris stood strong in the face of terrorism at 
the brink of global climate coordination in 2015. Understanding that 
energy and human security are not mutually exclusive is long overdue. 
Recognizing that global climate coordination can overcome collective 
inaction is the first step in making what has broadly been called 
impossible increasingly inevitable. 
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What is security? – this has been an evolving shared norm as peoples 
become ever more enmeshed globally. During the Paris negotiations, 
the Washington Post published the widespread experience of most 
climate talks participants for decades – we continue to pour over 
“confusing texts full of noncommittal brackets. Upon this, it seems, 
does the fate of the planet depend. We don’t know yet which brackets 
will come off.”143 We do know the stakes are high, that it is not hard 
to blow up urban infrastructure to make a point, and that common 
ground can be elusive. 
The Paris that this author recalled as a school child commuting by 
public bus has evolved as well. Paris deserves substantial 
congratulation not only for hosting historic multilateral diplomacy 
success but also for its own endeavors to address climate change. 
While pollution remains an issue, public transport is extensive and 
effective. Since the traditional parade was called off due to the 
terrorists attacks that preceded the Paris climate talks, this author was 
able to reach Fontainebleau Forrest within an hour and a half by public 
transport for under $30 USD. This ancient array of rocks tumbling in 
and out of mossy thickets of trees grounded the climate talks 2015 for 
this author in a manner that was both micro and macro. Micro in that 
it was among the first forays into forest habitat, searching for edible 
chestnuts and such as a child, and macro because forests are global 
greenhouse gas equilibrators extraordinaire. Not all vegetation 
exchanges carbon in the same way and forests can vary in their 
capacities to be effective carbon sinks. That said, forests are 
biologically diverse and not easily restored in timeframes pertinent to 
the climate challenge. It is critical to sustain forests and forest 
livelihoods in a manner that neither leaves forests lacking critters nor 
creatures lacking forests. Humans have not mastered geoengineering 
on the micro or macro scale. Existing sinks are effective carbon 
sequestrators irrespective of our ingenuity with which to design our 
way into a downward curve of greenhouse gas emissions. Aforestation 
and wetland restoration can substantially enhance existing nature 
based carbon sinks. Helping forest and coastal communities sustain 
existing ecosystems is a highly effective means by which to lower 
carbon levels. 
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Climate solutions are not one-size-fits all. Yet communities in 
mountainous or arid land can find shared best practices. Similarly, 
cities can find solutions that can benefit other urban locals. One means 
by which to share such endeavors is through the new Capacity-
building Portal hosted by the secretariat of the UNFCCC.144 Another 
way to broaden know-how is for cities to facilitate climate monitoring. 
At present, NASA’s Orbiting Carbon Observatory-2 is the only U.S. 
satellite capable of measuring carbon dioxide emissions. Satellite, 
airplane-based instrumentation, and ground-based networks globally 
are at early stages of accurately monitoring greenhouse gas 
emissions.145 Contributing to this mapping endeavor can play a 
substantial role in helping jurisdictions, large and small, to engage in 
collectively implementing and strengthening Paris commitments. 
Game theory suggests that indeterminate future interactions can lead 
to cooperation. In other words, if an interaction is a one-off it is less 
likely to produce win-win dynamics. Coordinating engagement that 
keeps entities invested in each other’s progress can produce win-win 
dynamics. Compacts do just this. Be they water compacts, carbon 
market compacts, or epistemic community compacts, e.g. Compact of 
Mayors, there is value in coordinating climate responses.146 Entities 
other than nation states have shown substantial leadership in this 
regard. 
Post Paris, it is high time to recognize the heavy lifting that the city 
of Paris engaged in to bring about the degree of climate consensus that 
occurred in 2015. While it is by no means time to celebrate broad 
climate successes, the Paris Agreement and its related COP 21 
Decision represent high diplomacy on the part of Paris and all the 
entities with which Paris coordinated. Keeping this coordination 
momentum ramping up is the challenge going forward. 
Indigenous communities and front line cities may share little at first 
glance. Each has networks with which to advance climate friendly 
decision-making as a core endeavor of governance. By doing so each 
can also model evolving best practices through green design and 
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 146. COMPACT OF MAYORS, http://www.compactofmayors.org (last visited May 
23, 2017). 
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sensible building codes as well as effective and eloquent international 
diplomacy. 
Political will increases with the degree to which the stakes are high 
and immediate. Front line indigenous diplomats have been and 
continue to be among the change agents that have brought about 
climate coordination to date. We are the song-line that weaves 
evolving humanity. Governance innovation and innovation 
governance can together engage dynamic participatory decision-
making to address energy-water-climate challenges equitably and 
effectively. 
